



he Canadian economy did poorly in
the 1990s, particularly in the first half
of the decade. Table 1 considers decade
averages for Canada since 1920. It shows that
in the 1990s per capita real GDP never grew
more slowly, and unemployment was never
higher on average, since the decade of the
1930s. An offsetting factor was the marked
deceleration in consumer prices. Inflation,
according to the Consumer Price Index, was
at its lowest level since the 1930s. Table 2
extends the comparison to the eight largest
economies of the OECD over the 1990s.
Canada had the lowest growth rate of all
countries for per capita GDP. Its average
unemployment rate (of nearly 10 percent)
was not too far below those observed in
France and Italy. Again, Canada’s CPI infla-
tion rate was on the low side, exceeding only
those of France and Japan. This review will
focus on the last two dimensions of Canada’s
economic performance in the 1990s —
unemployment and inflation. The first
dimension — the trend growth of per capita
real GDP — is left for others to discuss.
The performance of the Canadian econ-
omy in the 1990s regarding unemployment
looks particularly bad when compared to that
of the United States. Chart 1 depicts the time
path of the Canada-US unemployment rate
differential (Canadian unemployment minus
US unemployment). It rose sharply to 4.5
percentage points in 1993 from 2.2 points in
1989, reflecting the comparative depth and
length of the Canadian recession. Then it
began to shrink after the Canadian recovery
finally took hold in 1997, but going into
2001 it was still 2.7 points — above the
1989 level. In contrast, as shown in Chart 2,
the Canada-US CPI inflation differential was
almost consistently negative, indicating that
inflation was higher in the United States
than in Canada every year except in 1991,
when the goods and services tax was intro-
duced in Canada. Over the nine-year period
1992-2000, the CPI inflation rate averaged
2.7 percent in the United States and 1.6 per-
cent in Canada.
In this broad description of events, the
key observation is the negative correlation
between inflation and unemployment out-
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MECHANISM
In assessing the role played by mone-
tary policy in the events of the 1990s, it is
useful to first clarify the framework for dis-
cussion. I will rely on the usual three-step
“transmission mechanism” of monetary pol-
icy (see Thiessen 1995). Consider the case
of the Bank of Canada tightening monetary
conditions. The first step is for the Bank to
withdraw cash from the financial system.
With less cash in circulation, the cost of
borrowing and short-term interest rates
increase. An immediate consequence is that
more foreign capital is attracted to
Canadian-dollar assets and that the
exchange rate of the Canadian dollar appre-
ciates. These simultaneous increases in
interest rates and in the value of the
Canadian dollar are exactly what is meant
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six decades, falling below the US rate. In
contrast, the unemployment rate was the
highest in six decades, exceeding the US rate
by a significant margin. This naturally raises
the following question: If there is a genuine
negative trade-off between inflation and
unemployment, were the policy choices made
to influence the actual outcomes for inflation
and unemployment in that trade-off the best
in the circumstances?
In the following sections, I argue that
Canadian interest and unemployment rates
were too high and that inflation was too low.
I attribute a large share of responsibility for
these outcomes to excessively restrictive
monetary policy. I suggest various ways in
which Canadian monetary policy could be
welfare-improving in the future.
TABLE 1
Growth, Unemployment and CPI Inflation in
Canada, Decade Averages 1920s-1990s
Growth rate of Unemployment CPI  
real per capita  rate inflation  
Decade GDP (%/year) (%) rate (%/year)
1920s 4.31 3.52 -0.6
1930s -0.6 13.1 -1.8
1940s 3.8 3.2 4.7
1950s 2.4 4.2 2.4
1960s 3.2 5.0 2.5
1970s 3.0 6.7 7.3
1980s 1.7 9.4 6.5
1990s 1.1 9.6 2.2
Note: The growth rate of real GDP per capita is the
annual percentage change in the ratio of GDP in con-
stant dollars to the total population; the unemployment
rate is the average proportion of the labour force who
are without work; the CPI inflation rate is the annual per-
centage change in the all-items CPI. The standard defi-
nition of decades is 1920-29 and so on. For growth and
inflation, the calculated averages are compounded aver-
age rates of changes over the decade.
1 Average for 1926-29.
2 Average for 1921-29.
Source: Statistics Canada.
TABLE 2
Growth, Unemployment and CPI Inflation in
the Eight Largest OECD Countries, 1990s
Averages
Growth rate of Unemployment  CPI  
real per capita  rate inflation  
Country GDP (%/year) (%) rate (%/year)
United 2.0 5.8 3.0
States
Japan 1.4 3.1 1.2
Germany 1.6 7.5 2.5
France 1.2 11.3 1.9
Italy 1.4 10.6 4.2
United 1.6 8.2 3.7
Kingdom
Canada 1.1 9.6 2.2
Spain 2.3 19.9 4.2
Note: See definitions in the note to Table 1.
Unemployment rates are based on the standardized def-
initions used by the OECD.
Source: OECD.
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The second step in the transmission mecha-
nism is that higher interest rates and the
appreciated Canadian dollar both depress
aggregate spending and output. Higher
interest rates discourage consumption and
investment, and the appreciated dollar slows
down exports and stimulates imports. Lower
sales and profits then induce firms to reduce
output and employment. The third step is
that weaker profits and higher unemploy-
ment induce firms and workers to be more
prudent in setting wages and prices. Wage
growth and price inflation both decline.
Two important characteristics of this mech-
anism are that it takes up to two years to
unfold and that it operates in an uncertain
economic environment.
The following arrow diagram summa-
rizes the transmission mechanism:
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expectations and gives a clear signal to pub-
lic and private sector agents as to what
monetary policy is up to and how it is going
to react under various circumstances, thus
reducing uncertainty. Since 1995 in Canada,
the official inflation target has been 2 per-
cent, which is the midpoint of the official
target range of 1 to 3 percent.
The arrow diagram clarifies the nature
of the policy conflict between the objectives
of low unemployment and low inflation.
Increasing interest rates and the value of the
dollar raises unemployment and reduces
inflation; decreasing interest rates and the
value of the dollar reduces unemployment
and raises inflation. There is a trade-off, and
a policy choice cannot be avoided. I will
accordingly consider three broad questions
concerning the conduct of monetary policy
in the 1990s. First, have interest rates been
too high? Second, have output and employ-
ment been too low? Third, has the inflation
rate been too low? My answers to these ques-
tions will be: yes, yes and yes.
CHART 1
The Canada-US Unemployment Rate
Differential: Canadian Unemployment Minus








89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Percentage points







Within this framework, the mandate
of Canadian monetary policy since the
beginning of the 1990s has been to achieve
a specified inflation target at least cost in
terms of lost output and employment.
Setting an inflation target within a speci-
fied range is, in my view, a reasonable way
of conducting monetary policy in a country
operating under a regime of flexible
exchange rate. It helps to stabilize inflation
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the rate of inflation down to lower levels than
had prevailed in the 1980s.” He admits that
the Bank of Canada and other forecasters
were then taken by surprise by the swift reac-
tion of the economy: “Although the consen-
sus forecast at the time was for a soft landing
of the economy, the downturn in 1990-91
was much deeper than had been anticipated,
the rate of inflation came down much faster
than planned, and the recovery was slower
than expected.”
Freedman attributes the first two occur-
rences to the US recession and a sharp decline
in commodity prices. He then explains the
third development — the extended weakness
of the economy past 1991 — by three factors.
First, the severe fiscal problems experienced
by all levels of government initially “resulted
in higher interest rates on Canadian debt, as
risk premiums were built into medium- and
longer-term interest rates.” Later, the tax




Chart 3 shows the evolution of
Canadian and US real (i.e., net of CPI infla-
tion) short-term interest rates since 1987. In
the seven-year period 1989-95, the Canadian
rate exceeded the US rate by an unprece-
dented margin of 3.12 percentage points on
average. Does this mean Canadian interest
rates were too high and Canadian monetary
policy too tight in this period?
Before answering this question, it is
important to hear the account of Canadian
economic events of the decade given by the
Bank of Canada. A recent article by Deputy
Governor Freedman gives exactly such an
account (Freedman, in press). Recognizing
that Canada’s economic performance in the
1990s, especially in the first half of the
decade, was “not entirely satisfactory,”
Freedman begins by stating: “The tighten-
ing of monetary conditions in the latter part
of the 1980s and the introduction of infla-
tion targets in 1991 were aimed at fore-
CHART 3
Real 3-month Interest Rate on Corporate
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CHART 2
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to bring the fiscal situation back under con-
trol had the unavoidable side effect of pro-
longing the sluggishness of domestic spending
and output. Second, Freedman argues, global-
ization, free trade, deregulation and techno-
logical change generated significant private
sector restructuring, which increased the neg-
ative effects on aggregate spending, output
and employment.
Third, he suggests that although the
Bank of Canada came to realize aggregate
activity was declining further and wanted to
provide more support to the ailing economy,
its “attempts to reduce short-term interest
rates were hindered.” He explains: “On a
number of occasions...nervousness in the
markets about the combination of the fiscal
situation in Canada, domestic political devel-
opments, and international financial devel-
opments resulted in higher interest rates and
tighter monetary conditions than the Bank
desired... In such circumstances...efforts by
the Bank to aggressively lower very short-
term interest rates would have risked under-
mining confidence in Canadian-dollar-
denominated assets and causing interest rates
further out the yield curve to increase — a
counter-productive outcome.” Freedman sees
confirmation of the key importance of fiscal
credibility in the fact that “it was only in the
second half of the 1990s, when the deficit
was brought under control and the debt-to-
GDP ratio was seen to be moving onto a
credible downward track, that the risk pre-
miums fell and Canadian interest rates were
able to move below US rates.”
I am sceptical about two specific argu-
ments made by Freedman. First, I find it hard
to believe that private sector restructuring
was a cause of sluggishness of the recovery.
The Deputy Governor seems to confuse a real-
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location shock affecting the composition of
demand with an aggregate demand shock
impacting on its level. Further, not to deny the
supply-side possibility that a major realloca-
tion shock could raise aggregate unemploy-
ment by increasing the degree of mismatch
in labour markets, the available evidence in
this particular instance is just the opposite.
From 1992 to 1996, the national unemploy-
ment rate declined by about 1.5 percentage
points at a given level of the aggregate job
offer rate. This indicated the degree of job
mismatch and structural unemployment were
both declining, not rising.
Second, I am not convinced by the
argument that market concerns about the fis-
cal situation and other developments pre-
vented the Bank of Canada from easing
monetary conditions. Monetary conditions
broadly mean the whole range of interest
rates and asset prices, including the exchange
rate, and bank liquidity. Even in instances
where markets interest rates would stead-
fastly refuse to decline despite large injec-
tions of central bank cash, monetary
conditions would still be improved by relax-
ing the constraints on bank credit and allow-
ing the exchange rate to depreciate to some
(limited) extent. Aggregate demand would
increase as a result.
Be that as it may, Freedman’s bottom
line is that fiscal policy is to blame and that
monetary policy was never in error. However,
an entirely different interpretation of
Canadian events in the 1989-95 period is
possible. It is arguable that the explosion of
debt-service costs, the deep and protracted
recession, the drop in fiscal revenue, the rise
in social expenditures, rising risk premiums,
unsettled financial markets, the constraints
on the central bank’s ability to ease monetary
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were all initiated by the high interest rates
the Bank of Canada had begun to set as early
as in 1988. It can also be argued that, in con-
trast, fiscal policy had been on the right
course. The structural fiscal balance had been
improving every year after 1985, and as of
1989 the debt-to-GDP ratio had been stabi-
lized. The comparison with US events is
quite revealing. Entering the 1990s with
approximately the same public sector debt-
to-GDP ratio as Canada at the end of the
1980s, the US Federal Reserve kept real
short-term interest rates more than 3 points
below Canadian rates on average over the
1989-95 period (Chart 3). In this way, the
United States avoided the kind of monetary
overkill that hit Canada and was able to
escape a full-blown economic and fiscal cri-
sis. The bottom line of this alternative story
is that monetary policy, not fiscal policy, is
to blame for Canada’s dismal economic per-
formance in the first half of the 1990s.
Which of the two stories makes more
sense? I am inclined to believe that monetary
policy was the first mover. It initiated the
unfortunate sequence of events by raising
interest rates sharply in the late 1980s. The
economic and fiscal crisis came later. But I
am nevertheless ready to concede that fiscal
policy had previously made the public sector
financially vulnerable and must share respon-
sibility for what happened. Even if the pub-
lic sector debt-to-GDP ratio had been
stabilized at the end of the 1980s, it was still
too high. The Canadian public sector was
exposed to a new round of rising debt and
deficits in the event that interest rates would
rise significantly. It should have been obvi-
ous to anyone that close coordination
between fiscal and monetary policy was
essential at the point (1988) when the Bank
of Canada began to raise interest rates to con-
tain and reduce inflation. Fiscal-monetary
coordination would have meant more mod-
erate increases in interest rates by the Bank
of Canada, and a strong fiscal commitment
to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio more quick-
ly. Without coordination, interest rates, the
budget and the entire economy went out of
control for seven years. Here again, the con-
trast with US events is striking. Recent
accounts of the interaction between
Greenspan’s Federal Reserve and the Bush
and Clinton administrations from 1987 to
2000 all emphasize that monetary-fiscal coor-
dination was a key ingredient of US macro-
economic success in the last decade (Martin
2000; Woodward 2000).
Why was fiscal-monetary coordination
absent from Canadian policy planning until
1995? It is hard to say. Clearly, the late
1980s were extremely busy years for the
Mulroney government. It had to simultane-
ously handle several delicate reforms involv-
ing deregulation, privatization, major tax
changes, free trade and so on. Maybe it
thought monetary policy was one ball too
many to juggle and was only too happy to
give the Bank of Canada carte blanche with
interest rates. And maybe in turn the Bank
of Canada failed to make as forcefully clear to
the government as it should have the dire
financial consequences of higher interest rates
interacting with the large accumulated debt.
Whatever the reason, policy coordination
does not seem to have been part of the vocab-
ulary of the time.
To summarize, the fact that Canadian
interest rates were too high for too long is
universally acknowledged, including by the
Bank of Canada. But there are differences in
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that interest rates stayed high mainly because
the fiscal situation had deteriorated so much
that markets began to require risk premiums
to hold Canadian-dollar assets. Others point
out that the fiscal situation would not have
reached that point if the Bank of Canada had
not raised interest rates so sharply in the first
place. Obviously, the problem stemmed from
the damaging interaction between high accu-
mulated public debt and high interest rates,
and the solution resided in a monetary-fiscal
pact to reduce the debt and keep interest
rates low. Policy coordination could have
avoided the problem, but unfortunately did
not take place. To witness, by establishing a
better mix between the two policy levers —
tighter budgets and easier money — at an
early stage, the United States experienced a
shallower and shorter recession followed by a
swift recovery.
HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
Lack of policy coordination was one
type of policy error made in the first half of
the 1990s. But serious difficulties also
marked the management of aggregate
demand by the Bank of Canada throughout
the decade. As indicated earlier in the
description of the monetary transmission
mechanism, interest rates and the exchange
rate exert a lasting influence on inflation
through their impact on aggregate spending,
output and employment. More specifically,
the central bank normally tries to set mone-
tary conditions so as to influence the gap
between actual output and a threshold level
of output called potential output. Potential out-
put is defined as the maximum level of out-
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put that can be sustained without inducing
a general price acceleration. The further actu-
al output is below potential output — that
is, the larger the output gap the stronger the
downward pressure on inflation. In real time,
output gap management is an important
component of central bank operations
because it constitutes the key intermediate
link between the immediate monetary
instrument — interest rates — and the ulti-
mate target of policy — the inflation rate. It
takes about a year for the output gap to react
to the initial monetary impulse, and another
year for the inflation rate to respond to the
induced change in the output gap.
The process of targeting a certain level
of the output gap (with an eye to controlling
inflation) can be subject to three types of
error. First, potential output is an unknown
quantity that must be estimated. It can be
overestimated or underestimated. Second, the
level of output targeted by the central bank
can be too high or too low relative to the esti-
mated potential output. Third, actual output
may eventually turn out to exceed or fall
short of targeted output. I see evidence of a
systematic tendency on the part of the Bank
of Canada to err on the low side in all three
components of its operations. Most of the
time, actual output fell short of targeted out-
put, targeted output was kept below the esti-
mated potential and potential output itself
was underestimated.
During the 1990s the first tendency
was for actual output to fall short of target-
ed output. This came as a surprise to
the Bank of Canada. As Bank of Canada
researchers Freedman and Macklem (1998)
put it: “From 1989 to 1991, both real inter-
est rates and the real value of the Canadian
dollar were high, but between 1991 and
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decided to keep it there. After inflation
expectations had adjusted, the deterministic
solution would have called for bringing actu-
al output to match potential, thus leaving
neither upward nor downward pressure on
the inflation rate. This would have meant
planning for a zero output gap.
An important practical problem, how-
ever, is that potential output is unobserved
and has to be estimated by the central bank.
In this uncertain environment, it is not usual-
ly optimal to plan for actual output to match
the estimated level of potential output as if the
latter were certain. In general, the optimal
solution of this planning problem under
uncertainty is to aim for an actual output level
that makes the subjective probability of
exceeding the true potential output a decreas-
ing function of the perceived cost of doing so.
In other words, if you think exceeding the true
potential output level is very expensive
because you figure the recession cost of elimi-
nating the resulting increase in inflation is
large, then you will make sure the probability
of making that mistake is very small. For a
sufficiently large estimated cost, you will aim
for an actual output level below your subjective
expected value for potential output.
Is there evidence that, during the
1990s, the Bank of Canada was seriously con-
cerned about the prospect of actual output
exceeding potential output? Yes. While,
understandably, there was no official state-
ment to that effect, the Bank of Canada
Research Department put out many papers
suggesting that inflation responded signifi-
cantly more to the output gap when actual
output was above potential than when it was
below it (e.g., Fillion and Léonard 1997;
Laxton et al. 1993a; Macklem 1997). Laxton
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1995 the Canadian dollar depreciated by
more than 25 per cent. Based on historical
estimates of the effects of monetary condi-
tions on aggregate demand, the puzzle is why
we did not see a stronger recovery, given the
easing in monetary conditions over the
period.” In other words, even if interest rates
remained high, the exchange rate deprecia-
tion was so large that the Bank thought
monetary conditions were easy and monetary
policy expansionary on net.
As we have seen, Freedman (in press)
explains this implementation error after the
fact by the fiscal situation, by the risk pre-
miums it introduced into the interest rate
structure and by private sector restructuring.
But this explanation is hard to accept, since
the central bank could observe fiscal policy
and the high levels of medium- to longer-
term interest rates and take their aggregate
demand consequences into account in setting
short-term interest rates. Further, there is no
evidence of negative effects of restructuring
on aggregate demand. A more plausible expla-
nation is that the Bank of Canada seriously
underestimated the negative effects of high
interest rates on consumption and invest-
ment, and overestimated the favourable
effects of the exchange rate depreciation on
net exports. This interpretation is given cre-
dence by Freedman and Macklem’s admission
that a key output equation (Duguay 1994)
previously used by the Bank to measure the
response of output to the short-term interest
rate and the exchange rate and to construct
the Bank’s monetary conditions index turned
out to overestimate output cumulatively by
12 percent over the 1992-96 period.
The second tendency has been for tar-
geted output to be held below the estimated
level of potential output. Once inflation had
120
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explicit, and further argued that “if a central
bank cannot be sure of whether the economy
is non-linear or linear, it is better off main-
taining the a priori position that the econo-
my is non-linear.”
This continued insistence on non-linear
inflation dynamics makes it almost a sure bet
that the Bank of Canada aimed for positive
output gaps in order to buy insurance against
unknowingly crossing over the potential out-
put line. It should be noted that no such fear
of non-linearity was held at the US Federal
Reserve or at the US Council of Economic
Advisers (e.g., Blinder 1998; Stiglitz 1997).
The third tendency has been for true
potential output to be underestimated. The
Bank of Canada has in fact recently admit-
ted that its methods had previously led it to
underestimate true potential output (Bank
of Canada 1999). It attributes this system-
atic bias to the greater-than-expected eco-
nomic restructuring that took place in
Canada in the 1990s and encouraged faster
productivity growth.
But to construct its estimate of poten-
tial output the Bank also relied on question-
able smoothing techniques and neglected
widespread evidence of declining structural
unemployment. In essence, the Bank applied
mechanical trend-fitting techniques (called
“filters”) to the past history of actual output,
and then weighted the results of this opera-
tion judgementally with certain estimated
statistical relationships (Butler 1996).
Unfortunately, this methodology seems liable
to automatically build sustained slumps into
the estimated trend of potential output
(Krugman 1998). One result was that, over
the seven-year period 1990-96, the Bank’s
estimate of the average growth rate of poten-
tial GDP per capita for Canada was only 0.4
percent per year. This does not make sense
under any reasonable set of assumptions
about trend productivity growth and employ-
ment rate change.
In addition, the Bank was slow to rec-
ognize the tendency, which was already dis-
cernible by mid-decade, for the national
unemployment rate to decline at any given
level of the job offer rate (see Fortin 1999).
Consistent with this shift, the relative size of
the youth labour force was declining, the
average level of education was rising rapidly,
deregulation and globalization were increas-
ing competitive pressure in labour and prod-
uct markets, and stiffer regulations were
imposed on access to unemployment insur-
ance benefits. All of these factors are known
to reduce the minimum non-inflationary
unemployment rate, and hence to increase
potential output.
The three types of error just reviewed
— actual output below targeted output, tar-
geted output below estimated potential out-
put and estimated potential output below
true potential output — have all contributed
to holding actual output below true poten-
tial output. This has imparted a deflationary
bias to Canadian monetary policy not only in
the first half of the decade but in the second
half as well. Consequently, the inflation rate
was too low.
LOW INFLATION
In 1988 the Bank of Canada announced
it would pursue the medium-term objective
of “price stability,” which essentially meant
reducing CPI inflation below 2 percent
(Bank of Canada 1988). In early 1991 the
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Finance jointly announced the setting of tar-
gets for reducing CPI inflation and reaching
price stability in Canada. The official infla-
tion target was set at 3 percent by the end of
1992, 2.5 percent by the middle of 1994
and 2 percent by the end of 1995 (Bank of
Canada 1991). The agreement between the
Governor and the Minister was renewed in
1993 and 1998, extending the 2 percent tar-
get from the end of 1995 to the end of 2001
(Bank of Canada 1993/94, 1998). The agree-
ment has provided for a target range of plus
or minus one percentage point around the
official target. Thus since 1995 the official
inflation target has been 2 percent and the
target range has been 1 to 3 percent. The
target is defined in terms of the 12-month
rate of increase in the total CPI, but the
operational guide for policy has been the
increase in the CPI excluding food, energy
and the effect of indirect taxes, called the core
inflation rate.
The inflation rate was too low in
Canada through the 1990s, for two reasons.
First, the actual inflation rate was kept sys-
tematically below the official target. Second,
as I will argue, the official target itself was
set at too low a level.
Actual Inflation Below Target
Chart 4 establishes that from December
1991 to March 2001 actual inflation never
exceeded the inflation target except for eight
months in 1995 and one month in 1997. In
that nine-year period, core inflation was 0.70
point below target on average. Even in the
more recent 1996-2000 period, after the fis-
cal situation could no longer be used as an
excuse, the gap between actual and target
inflation still averaged 0.55 points.
There are three possible explanations
for this systematic undershooting of target.
The first is that the Bank of Canada was hon-
estly aiming at target throughout the 1990s
but was frustrated by an incredible string of
bad luck, with unexpected factors constant-
ly pushing actual inflation below target.
However, once the variability of the inflation
process is taken into account, formal statisti-
cal tests show that the probability bad luck
would strike five years in a row from 1996 to
2000 is less than 1/1000. Pure randomness
must be rejected.
The second possible explanation is that
the Bank of Canada always wanted to achieve
the inflation target but kept undershooting
it for various reasons. At times, it may have
felt the fiscal situation and other uncertain-
ties were hindering its efforts to reduce inter-
est rates. It may also have kept actual output
too far below its true non-inflationary poten-
tial for all the reasons enumerated in the pre-
vious section: misjudgement of interest rate
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underestimation of true potential output.
The final possibility is that, even
though the 1991 joint communiqué speci-
fied “it is the midpoints of the range that
will be the objective of monetary policy
actions...rather than the upper or lower band”
(Bank of Canada 1991), the Bank may nev-
ertheless have decided it would keep actual
inflation below the official target. The reason
it would have consciously undershot the offi-
cial inflation target is to position itself strate-
gically to convince the government the target
should be reduced further below 2 percent.
That would have been in conformity with the
statement of the 1991 communiqué that
price stability was “a rate of increase in the
CPI that is clearly below 2 per cent.” Former
Governor Crow seemed to support this
strategic approach in 1997 when he declared
that there was “no good economic reason to
drive inflation up from current levels after
having got it down and kept it down —
whether that was by intention or by good
fortune.” Hence, “with inflation already hav-
ing been held at around 1.5 percent for a
number of years, 0.5 to 2.5 percent could eas-
ily be announced as a target range that con-
stitutes a working definition of price
stability” (Crow 1997). However, in 1998
the government was not ready to lower the
official target below 2 percent.
Why should it matter that actual infla-
tion averaged a mere 0.5 point less than the
official target rate over an extended period?
Essentially because, when inflation is already
very low, even a slight further reduction in
inflation could have important damaging
impacts on the levels of output and employ-
ment that could be sustained permanently. I
will in fact argue not only that the 1.5 per-
cent average inflation rate achieved over the
past decade was too low, but that the 2 per-
cent official target was itself too low. The
unemployment-minimizing rate of inflation
would likely be in the 2.5 to 3 percent range
and could support an unemployment rate as
low as 5.3 percent in Canada.
Target Inflation Set Too Low
The traditional view of the trade-off
between inflation and unemployment — the
third component of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism described earlier — is that
the benefits from very low inflation are “large
and permanent” and the related unemploy-
ment costs are “small and temporary.” While
lower inflation has to be purchased at the
cost of higher unemployment, this negative
trade-off would be purely transitory. Many
central bankers share this view. The macro-
economic expression of this idea is the fol-
lowing equation:
annual change in inflation = 
½ x (NAIRU - actual 
unemployment)
This equation says inflation will
increase, remain unchanged or decrease
depending on whether the actual unemploy-
ment rate is less than, equal to or greater
than some threshold unemployment rate,
called the non-accelerating-inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU). The NAIRU is
exactly what I called the minimum non-
inflationary unemployment rate in the pre-
vious section. It is the outcome of economic
forces independent from monetary policy. We
can call the difference between the NAIRU
and actual unemployment the unemployment
gap. The unemployment gap in labour mar-
kets is the analogue of the output gap in
product markets defined earlier. In fact, the
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tion called Okun’s Law. As indicated in the
equation, the standard estimate for the pro-
portionality factor between the annual
change in inflation and the unemployment
gap is about one-half.
In this framework, a central bank can
reduce inflation simply by temporarily rais-
ing actual unemployment above the NAIRU.
It does so by first tightening monetary con-
ditions to open an unemployment gap, then
allowing inflation to decline, and finally eas-
ing monetary conditions to close the unem-
ployment gap again once the job of reducing
inflation is done. In the long run, there is a
unique rate of unemployment that is consis-
tent with an unchanging level of inflation
(whatever that level turns out to be), name-
ly the NAIRU itself. This can be represented
by a vertical straight line in the unemploy-
ment-inflation plane.
The problem with this traditional view
of the inflation process is that it is a total fail-
ure as a description of the time paths of infla-
tion and unemployment in Canada over the
past decade. To see this, one need only set out
a reasonable path for the NAIRU over 1992-
2000 and calculate how much cumulative
deflationary pressure the path of actual
unemployment would have generated as a
result. I will assume, conservatively, that the
Canadian NAIRU declined by 15 basis
points a year, from 8.2 percent in 1989 (the
Bank of Canada estimate for that year) to 6.6
percent in 2000 (which is slightly less than
the actual unemployment rate of 6.8 percent
for that year). Evidence of this kind of struc-
tural decrease in the NAIRU during the past
decade was mentioned in the previous sec-
tion. This assumption about the trend in the
NAIRU implies that the sum of annual
unemployment gaps (the annual differences
between actual unemployment and the
NAIRU) cumulated to 19.4 percentage
points over the nine years from 1992 to
2000. Given the proportionality factor of
one-half, core inflation should have declined
by 9.7 points from 1992 to 2000. But in fact
the annual level of core inflation for 2000
(1.5 percent) was actually unchanged from
its 1992 level.
This is a severe case of “missing defla-
tion.” In my view, it delivers a death blow to
the traditional view of the inflation-unem-
ployment trade-off contained in the equation
above. It cannot be countered that the extra
deflationary pressure created by the substan-
tial gap between observed unemployment
and the NAIRU was needed to deal with
some large inflationary supply-side shocks.
There were no such lasting shocks: On the
wage front, union militancy was weak and
wage moderation the rule. On the price
scene, inflation rates from imports, food,
energy and indirect tax changes were rough-
ly in line with core inflation cumulatively.
Measures of expected inflation were also
roughly in line with past-year inflation. From
1992 up to the 2000 oil shock, on average
about 85 percent of respondents to the semi-
annual Conference Board Survey expected
prices to increase by 2 percent or less.
If the “traditional” view of the infla-
tion-unemployment trade-off is contradicted
by evidence from the 1990s, what should it
be replaced with? An even older view. It is
striking to observe that, in the previous peri-
od of low inflation during the 1950s and
1960s, it was widely accepted that nominal
wage and price rigidities mattered a great
deal and that very low inflation was harmful
to growth. To generate a “new” view of the
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appropriate for a low-inflation economy, it is
therefore worth revisiting ideas put forward
in those days. I focus on views developed by
James Tobin (1972) and by Otto Eckstein
and Roger Brinner (1972).
Central to Tobin’s analysis of the low-
inflation environment is the effect of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity in an economy in
which individual firms keep experiencing
unforeseen changes in the demand for their
output. As the central bank seeks to achieve
lower and lower inflation, the percentage of
firms and workers facing and resisting the
prospect of a nominal wage cut at any point
in time increases. Firms are also reluctant to
impose absolute wage cuts for fear of losing
their best employees and suffering a drop in
productivity. This general resistance to lower
wages means that the authorities can achieve
lower inflation only by imposing a perma-
nently stronger dose of unemployment on the
rest of the economy. The implications of
Tobin’s analysis are the following: In the
range of moderate to high inflation rates,
where few nominal wage constraints would
have to be faced, the long-run trade-off
between inflation and unemployment could
be vertical at a unique NAIRU level in the
unemployment-inflation plane, just as the
traditional view predicts. But in the range
of low inflation rates, where nominal wage
constraints would become more and more
common, the trade-off would be negatively
sloped, convex and eventually flat at very
low inflation rates (see Akerlof et al. 1996).
Maintaining price stability or very low infla-
tion in the presence of even a small amount
of downward nominal wage rigidity (for
instance, when only 10 to 20 percent of
wage changes are constrained) could then
generate significant permanent losses in
employment and output.
Eckstein and Brinner questioned the
traditional view from a different perspective.
They speculated that low inflation rates were
partially ignored by wage- and price-setters.
Reviewing US experience from 1955 to
1970, they suggested that, as inflation rose
from less than 2 percent to greater than 5
percent, workers showed “increased aware-
ness and concern” with the real purchasing
power of their wages, so that past inflation
became incorporated more fully into nomi-
nal wage contracts. Building on this intu-
ition, Akerlof et al. (2000) offer several
reasons and evidence for the tendency of
wage- and price-setters to ignore inflation
when it increases from zero to a small value.
Basically, they argue that the cost to wage-
and price-setters of ignoring inflation in this
context is negligible, which makes this kind
of behaviour “near-rational.”
The key implication of near-rational
ignorance of inflation is that nominal wages
will be set higher in absolute terms, but
lower relative to prices, when inflation is pos-
itive than when inflation is zero. As a result,
operating the economy at a low positive rate
of inflation will increase the permanent level
output and employment. There will be a
small one-time decline in the average ratio of
wages to prices, which will make it more
profitable for firms to hire more workers and
produce more output. Formerly disenfran-
chised workers will be able to join the main-
stream labour market. Naturally, when
inflation increases, as occurred in the 1970s,
the cost of being less than perfectly rational
will rise, and people will switch their behav-
iour to take inflation fully into account.
Their behaviour becomes “traditional.” As
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rational behaviour, the initial output and
employment gains begin to evaporate. This
means that further increases in permanent
inflation will reduce permanent output and
employment. The important implication of
this story, however, is that there is an unem-
ployment-minimizing inflation rate,  precise-
ly where permanent output and employment
cease to increase and begin to decrease.
Chart 5 shows what happens to the
long-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment when Tobin’s view on the
effect of downward nominal wage rigidities
and Eckstein and Brinner’s intuition that
inflation is partially ignored when it is low
are blended together. This picture is drawn
from preliminary results obtained by Fortin
and Dumont (2000) for Canada, but it is
entirely consistent with similar results
obtained by Akerlof et al. (2000) for the
United States. For inflation rates above 6.5
percent, there is a unique NAIRU as in the
traditional case. Its estimated value, 6.1 per-
cent, is the level of unemployment that can
be sustained with unchanging inflation in
the long run. As permanent inflation falls
below 6.5 percent, however, the Tobin
wage-floor effect begins to be felt. The
trade-off becomes negatively sloped and
convex. At around 4.5 percent inflation, the
rate experienced in the 1980s, sustainable
unemployment reaches a local maximum of
7 percent (point A). Then the Eckstein-
Brinner partial-neglect effect sets in and
reverses the slope of the curve until unem-
ployment finds its lowest sustainable level
at 5.3 percent with an inflation rate of 2.8
percent (point B). As inflation is further
reduced, the wage-floor and partial-neglect
effects combine to raise unemployment very
rapidly: the next 2-point decline in inflation
— to 0.8 from 2.8 percent — adds 3.3
points to the unemployment rate.
On this estimated long-run Canadian
trade-off, point B, with inflation at 2.8 per-
cent and unemployment at 5.3 percent, is
just about the social optimum. Going above
point B to higher unemployment and higher
inflation on the positively sloped segment of
the long-run trade-off is clearly socially infe-
rior. Nor is going below point B on the neg-
atively sloped segment of the curve
attractive. The social loss from higher per-
manent unemployment increases so rapidly
that only those who hold extreme views
about the cost of inflation would want to
move the economy significantly below point
B. If, as has been the case in Canada since
1992, the Bank of Canada holds inflation at
1.5 percent (at point C) instead of allowing
it to increase into the 2.5 to 3 percent range,
the national unemployment rate remains at
the 7 percent level and is prevented from
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inflation is very low a small increase in infla-
tion can have a major beneficial effect on
output and employment. Under standard
assumptions, the decrease of 1.7 points in
unemployment that is predicted to occur
when one moves up from point C to point B
would generate 340,000 permanent new jobs
and a permanent, sustained increase in annu-
al national income of $35 billion. Further
evidence supporting the existence and impor-
tance of downward nominal wage rigidity in
modern economies has recently been obtained
from very large microdata sets by Lebow, Saks
and Wilson (2000) for the United States and
by Beissinger and Knoppik (2000) for
Germany. Empirical support for the partial-
neglect hypothesis also derives from the vast
literature on the inflation-unemployment
trade-off from the 1950s and 1960s, and from
numerous ethnographic, psychological and
industrial relations studies.
The estimates just reported and depicted
in Chart 5 suggest that in Canada nominal
wage and price rigidities tend to generate a
very flat permanent trade-off between inflation
and unemployment, in the range of zero to 2.5
percent inflation rates, and to increase unem-
ployment permanently if inflation is allowed
to significantly exceed 3 percent. Taking into
account the usual statistical uncertainty, the
prudent conclusion is that a welfare-maximiz-
ing monetary policy should search for the
unemployment-minimizing inflation rate in
the middle range of 2 to 4 percent, and not
below 2 percent nor above 4 percent.
I conclude that the 1.5 percent infla-
tion rate achieved by the Bank of Canada
over the past nine years is much too low. The
Bank has undershot the official target sys-
tematically, and it has set the official target
at too low a level. As a result, Canada has
experienced a great deal of needless and cost-
ly excess unemployment.
There are some who take the 1.5 percent
inflation rate and 7 percent unemployment
rate recently achieved by Canada as a very sat-
isfactory performance. Often heard are confi-
dent statements such as: “Canada’s experience
in the last few years and that of the United
States...in the second half of the 1990s show
that low inflation and strong demand can
coexist comfortably” (Freedman, in press). The
assertion that Canada’s recent economic per-
formance is comparable to that of the United
States is surprising. As Charts 1 and 2 show,
in recent years unemployment has been much
lower in the United States than in Canada,
while CPI inflation has been higher in the
United States than in Canada, exactly as pre-
dicted by the empirical trade-offs I have just
reported. Canadian authorities should be loath
to assume there are no opportunities for lower
unemployment simply because the unem-
ployment rate is currently the lowest in the
last quarter century. At present, global eco-
nomic performance must be judged against
the low average unemployment rate of the
low-inflation decades of the 1950s and 1960s,
not against the high average unemployment
rate of the higher-inflation decades of the
1970s and 1980s. By that standard, the
United States has been very successful in the
last few years, Canada much less so. In terms
of Chart 5, the United States is close to point
B and Canada is still close to point C.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Canadian economy did poorly in
the 1990s largely because interest rates and
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was too low. In the late 1980s the Bank of
Canada launched its drive toward price sta-
bility by raising interest rates sharply.
Interacting with the large accumulated pub-
lic debt, high interest rates eventually gen-
erated a full-blown economic and fiscal crisis
that lasted until a recovery finally began in
1996. A fiscal-monetary agreement to reduce
the debt-to-GDP ratio faster and keep inter-
est rates low — as occurred in the United
States — could have avoided the crisis, but
unfortunately the two macropolicy levers
remained uncoordinated for an extended
period. Instead, we had a central bank that
looked as if it wanted to teach the fiscal
authorities a lesson, and a government that
initially appeared unconcerned by the high
level of the debt. We have learned from this
sad episode in Canadian economic history
that inflation targeting does not relieve the
central bank and the government from the
duty of agreeing on the best policy mix for
economic stability and growth. In my view,
this presently means a continuation of low
interest rates and fiscal surpluses.
During the 1990s, serious difficulties
also marked the management of aggregate
demand by the Bank of Canada. First, actu-
al output kept falling below potential out-
put because the impacts of interest rate and
exchange rate changes on aggregate spend-
ing and output were misjudged. Second,
due to its excessive fear of actual output
exceeding potential, the Bank of Canada
tried to keep actual output below its esti-
mated level of potential output. By erring
on the conservative side, it was buying
insurance against the return of inflation.
Third, true potential output was also
underestimated because the Bank used an
inferior methodology and missed the early
downward trend in structural unemploy-
ment. All these problems of monetary man-
agement imparted a serious deflationary
bias to Canadian monetary policy through-
out the 1990s. Fortunately, there are indi-
cations that some of the problems have
been recognized and that solutions are
being implemented by the Bank of Canada.
For example, the Bank now seems more
careful in estimating the reaction of net
exports to changes in the exchange rate. Its
fear of an early return of inflation also
seems less excessive than it was five years
ago. And its methodology for estimating
potential output now looks at many more
indicators than in the past.
A major cause of persistent high unem-
ployment in the 1990s was the very low
inflation rate achieved by central bank policy
— 1.5 percent on average since 1992. First,
in contradiction to the prescription of the
1991 agreement between the Governor of the
Bank of Canada and the Minister of Finance,
inflation was kept below the official target
most of the time. Second, recent research
based on German, US and Canadian data has
raised the possibility that the official target
itself (2 percent since 1995) could be less than
the unemployment-minimizing inflation
rate. The bottom line of that research is that,
if the inflation target was increased into the
2.5 to 3 percent range from the current 2
percent level, Canada could sustain an unem-
ployment rate of 5.5 percent or less on a
permanent basis. This would represent a
reduction in unemployment from the current
level in excess of 1.5 points, or more than
300,000 permanent new jobs. National
income would increase by more than $30 bil-
lion annually, which translates into $1.5 tril-
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off is so large that the decision to increase the
inflation target into the 2.5 to 3 percent
range should be taken even if it has only a
small chance of materializing. We have
everything to gain and little to lose.
Adopting this strategy would require
the Bank of Canada to be opportunistic on
the expansionary side and tighten only if
there are tangible signs that inflation is
beginning to exceed 3 percent and will keep
rising. This new approach would bring the
Bank in line with the successful strategy
adopted by the US Federal Reserve under
Chairman Greenspan.
The setting of an official inflation target
is not inconsistent with the flexible oppor-
tunistic approach to inflation control recom-
mended here. If the game of inflation targeting
is retained, Canada should avoid the twin mis-
takes of setting a rigid long-term target and
setting a target of less than 2 percent. Freezing
the long-term inflation target is not sensible
because what is perceived as the optimal level
of inflation will always depend crucially on the
state of economic knowledge and economic
conditions (e.g., errors in measuring inflation,
the growth rate of productivity, changing eco-
nomic institutions). Both will evolve over time.
Setting the inflation target below 2 percent
now would amount to a cavalier dismissal of
the emerging body of evidence on the poten-
tially important role played by nominal wage
and price rigidities at very low levels of infla-
tion. Under the constraint that inflation tar-
geting is to remain the official monetary
strategy in Canada, the ideal decision would
definitely be to move the current 1 to 3 per-
cent inflation-target range up by a point to the
2 to 4 percent range. A 1.5 to 3.5 percent
range would be a fine compromise for now.
NOTE
I thank Chris Ragan and Andrew Sharpe for help-
ful discussions and advice.
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